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1.   Preliminary remarks 
 
The WTO dispute settlement system (DSS) is facing the most serious 
crisis since its inception.  
In December 2019 the term of two of the remaining three Appellate 
Body (AB) members expired. Under Rule 15 of the Working Procedures 
for Appellate Review, they continue to work on completing the disposi-
tion of appeals to which they had been assigned while they were mem-
bers, but they cannot process new appeals which were introduced fol-
lowing the completion of their term. Meanwhile no new members have 
been appointed because the United States has sought to block their se-
lection. It is not the first time that a State has opposed the election or re-
appointment of certain AB candidates under the veiled threat of using 
the consensus rule to bar a nomination.1 But it is the first time that a State 
has actually blocked the recruitment of any new AB members.  
It is public knowledge that the reason for the paralysis of the AB lies 
in the harsh US criticism of the increasing judicial activism shown by the 
AB.2  
 
* Assistant Professor of International Law, University of Florence. 
1 JL Dunoff, MA Pollack, ‘The Judicial Trilemma’ (2017) 111 AJIL 26.  
2 US concerns about the WTO dispute settlement and the approach of the AB were 
summarized in the President’s 2018 Trade Policy Agenda: ˂https://ustr.gov/ 
sites/default/files/files/Press/Reports/2018/AR/2018%20Annual%20Report%20I.pdf˃ 
22-28. See also G Adinolfi, ‘Procedural Rules in WTO Dispute Settlement in the Face of 
the Crisis of the Appellate Body’ (2019) 61 QIL-Questions Intl L 50-52. US disruption 
of the functioning of the AB was possible because AB members must be approved by 
consensus of WTO Members and their term can be extended once following the same 
procedure (art 17(2) DSU). Theoretically, such a process allows every State to block the 
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Blocking the ability of the AB to function may lead to a serious risk 
of disrupting the DSS as a whole.3 As long as the AB is unable to work, 
an appeal to the AB will prevent the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) 
from adopting any panel report.4 The latter will remain in limbo: it will 
exist, but will not be binding on the parties to the dispute.5 Some opti-
mistically maintain that the panel stage is still alive and that in the GATT 
1947 system vetoed reports had a certain role in the solution of disputes 
through negotiation.6 Nevertheless, this would result in a marginalization 
of the role of the DSS, which is far from a desirable result. 
The risk of panel reports being frozen, coupled with the paralysis in 
the AB appointment process, occurs at a particularly significant time 
given the content of some disputes before the WTO dispute settlement 
bodies. Indeed, for the first time in the history of the WTO, many claims 
have been filed to challenge the enforcement of national measures which 
are not in conformity with WTO law and which the respondent States 
had justified by invoking national security exceptions.  
Scarcely invoked since the conclusion of GATT 1947,7 GATT Article 
XXI is at the heart of a wide and never-ending debate on its scope.8 
 
establishment of the AB or the re-appointment of an unwelcome member. In reality, the 
rule of consensus gives veto power mainly to powerful States, because States are not 
equally able to sustain a veto:  T Cottier, S Takenoshita, ‘The Balance of Power in WTO 
Decision-Making: Towards Weighted Voting in Legislative Response’ (2003) 58 
Aussenwirtschaft, 176; C-D Ehlermann, L Ehring, ‘Decision-Making in the World Trade 
Organization’ (2005) 8 J Intl Economic L 66; P Low, ‘WTO Decision-Making for the 
Future’, WTO Staff Working Paper ERSD-2011-05 (2 May 2011) ˂www.wto.org/ 
english/res_e/reser_e/ersd201105_e.pdf˃; W Guam, ‘Consensus Yet Not Consented: A 
Critique of the WTO Decision-Making by Consensus’ (2014) 14 J Intl Economic L, 102; 
M Elsig, M A Pollack, ‘Agents, Trustees and International Courts: The Politics of Judicial 
Appointment at the World Trade Organization’ (2014) 20 Eur J Intl L 391. 
3 This is also the opinion of S Charnovitz, ‘A WTO If You Can Keep It’ (2019) 63 
QIL-Questions Intl L 14.  
4 Art 16(4) of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU).  
5 For considerations regarding the costs of appealing a panel report at the present 
time, see J Pauwelyn, ‘WTO Dispute Settlement Post 2019: What to Expect? What 
Choice to Make?’ (2019) <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3415964> 10-13. 
6 M Benitah, ‘Does the Present Paralysis of the AB Mean that the WTO is Dead? 
No, and This Is Why’ International Economic Law and Policy blog 
˂https://ielp.worldtradelaw.net/2019/12/does-the-present-paralysis-of-the-ab-means-that-
a-wto-panel-report-is-now-worthless.html˃.  
7 R Alford, ‘The Self-Judging WTO Security Exception’ (2011) 3 Utah L Rev 706 ff.  
8 See, among many others, MA Reiterer, ‘Article XXI GATT: Does the National 
Security Exception Permit “Anything Under the Sun”?’ (1997) 2 Austrian Rev Intl and 




Nevertheless, no panel reports had taken a stance on its reviewability or 
on the scope of the exemptions it allows until April 2019. 
The preference of States to leave the interpretation of national secu-
rity exceptions open may be the real rationale behind their unwillingness 
to bring claims before panels on the legality of measures justified by in-
voking GATT Article XXI. States would like to be free to evade their 
trade obligations by defining the measures deemed necessary to defend 
national security interests.  
Assuming that this is the real reason explaining why States have rarely 
defended national measures invoking security exceptions before the DSS, 
since 2017 States’ attitudes have changed. In fact, more panels have been 
set up to rule on national measures justified under GATT Article XXI. 
Moreover, in April 2019 a panel ruled on the legality of measures which 
the defendant considered to be lawful under this provision in the case of 
Russia – Traffic in transit (see para 2).  
Unfortunately, the coincidence between the crisis of the DSS and the 
occurrence of many claims on measures adopted under Article XXI may 
hamper the development (and consolidation) of a jurisprudential stance 
on the reviewability and scope of GATT Article XXI. Indeed, because of 
the highly politicized nature of disputes concerning the enforcement of 
such provisions, it is likely that the adoption of the panel reports will be 
blocked by the disputing parties providing notice of their decision to ap-
peal. Surprisingly, the crippling effect of the DSS crisis on the develop-
ment of WTO case law on national security exceptions has not been ad-





Eur L, 191-212; R Bhala, ‘National Security and International Trade Law: What the 
GATT Says, and What the United States Does’ (1998) 19 University of Pennsylvania J 
Intl L 263-317; HL Schloemann, S Ohlhoff, ‘Constitutionalization and Dispute 
Settlement in the WTO: National Security as an Issue of Competence’ (1999) 93 AJIL 
424-451; D Akande, S Williams-Elegbe, ‘International Adjudication on National Security 
Issues: What Role for the WTO?’ 43 (2003) Virginia J Intl L 365-404; A Emmerson, 
‘Conceptualizing Security Exceptions: Legal Doctrine or Political Excuse?’ (2008) 11 J 
Intl Economic L 135-154; S Schill, R Briese, ‘If States Consider: Self-Judging Clauses in 
International Dispute Settlement’ (2009) 13 Max Planck Yb UN L 97-110.  
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2.  An overview of disputes relating to measures justified under national 
security exceptions 
 
In the last few years several WTO Members have requested the es-
tablishment of WTO panels to rule on the conformity with WTO law of 
national measures adopted by other Members who justify them by invok-
ing Article XXI of the GATT (or Article 73 of the TRIPS Agreement). 
The latter allows WTO Members to derogate from WTO law in order to 
protect national security interests.   
In particular, Article XXI provides, inter alia, that obligations stem-
ming from the GATT must not be construed ‘(b) to prevent any Member 
from taking any action which it considers necessary for the protection of 
its essential security interests … (iii) taken in time of war or other emer-
gency in international relations’.   
In April 2019, for the first time in the history of the GATT 1947 and 
1994, a panel adopted a report concerning a national measure adopted 
under Article XXI. It focused on a dispute between the Russian Federa-
tion and Ukraine on Russian restrictions and bans on the transit of goods 
from Ukraine to other countries, across Russia.9 The issues that arose in 
the dispute are the result of the overall deterioration in relations between 
Ukraine and Russia that has been ongoing since 2014. Ukraine claimed a 
violation of Articles V and X of the GATT and Russia’s Accession Pro-
tocol. Russia asserted that the measures were among those it considered 
necessary for the protection of its essential security interests in view of 
the international relations crisis with Ukraine and justified them under 
Article XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT. According to Russia, the panel lacked 
jurisdiction to address any of the issues in dispute because Article XXI 
was a self-judging provision.10 The panel concluded, on the contrary, that 
Article XXI was a justiciable rule11 and clarified the scope of the provi-
sion of paragraph (b)(iii). In particular, it took a stance on the notions of 
‘emergency in international relations’ and ‘necessity’. Moreover, it clari-
fied whether the identification of States’ essential security interests was 
 
 9 Panel Report, Russia - Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit (Ukraine) WTO doc 
WT/DS512/R (5 April 2019) para 7.1.  
10 ibid para 7.22 f.  
11 ibid paras 7.53-7.104.  




of exclusive competence of the States invoking Article XXI, or whether 
WTO law limited States’ freedom to decide over them.12 
The DSB adopted the panel report a few days after its circulation.13 
The parties to the dispute informally agreed not to appeal to the AB, 
making the panel report binding for them, although in April 2019 the 
starting of an AB procedure (and its conclusion under Rule 15 of the 
Working Procedures) would still have been possible.  
The agreement between the Russian Federation and Ukraine was 
reached because neither party had an interest in appealing the panel re-
port. The Russian Federation won the dispute, because the panel found 
that its national measures were permitted under GATT Article XXI.14 As 
far as Ukraine is concerned, while it was the loser in the dispute it prob-
ably considered the panel report’s conclusion to be in its own interest. In 
fact, Ukraine itself might be interested in invoking GATT Article 
XXI(b)(iii) before the panel, whose establishment Russia had requested 
for the purpose of evaluating the WTO consistency of Ukrainian 
measures adopted in 2016, and which Russia claimed were not in com-
pliance with several covered agreements, as well as Ukraine’s WTO Ac-
cession Protocol.15  
The informal agreement between Russia and Ukraine not to resort to 
the AB may not be possible in other disputes where the respondent par-
ties have been invoking security exceptions as justification for national 
measures not in conformity with WTO law.  
Several States16 and the European Union have requested the estab-
lishment of panels to challenge US tariffs on imported aluminium and 
steel products which are in excess of the rates set forth in the US schedule 
of concessions.17 The United States has invoked GATT Article XXI to 
 
12 ibid paras 7.76, 7.122-7.125; 7.130-7.149. For a comment on the Panel report, see 
V Lapa, ‘Note on the Russia-Traffic in Transit Case’ (2020) 69 QIL-Questions Intl L 5. 
13 WTO doc WT/DS512/7 (29 April 2019).  
14 Panel Report, Russia - Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit paras 7.122-7.125; 
7.130-7.149. 
15 WTO doc WT/DS525/1 (1 June 2017).  
16 Turkey, Switzerland, Russia, Norway, India, China, Mexico and Canada. 
17 WTO doc WT/DS/544/9, WT/DS/547/12, WT/DS/548/15, WT/DS/550/12, 
WT/DS/551/12, WT/DS/552/11, WT/DS/554/15, WT/DS556/16, WT/DS564/1. All 
panels were composed on 25 January 2019. In the dispute between the US and, respec-
tively, Canada and Mexico, mutually agreed solutions were reached (WTO doc 
WT/DS550/13 (27 May 2019); WT/DS/551/R (6 June 2019)) because the US eliminated 
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justify them. Indeed, according to the US, the internal steel and alumin-
ium market has been suffering from massive excess capacity, which has 
depressed prices and undermined the profitability of domestic industries 
and made it impossible for them to remain viable over the long term. 
From the US point of view, this has consequences for national (and 
global) security because US military forces rely on the US steel and alu-
minium industries.18 The US has also been claiming that Article XXI is a 
not reviewable provision.19  
Similarly, in the disputes between Qatar, on one hand, and the United 
Arab Emirates,20 Bahrain21 and Saudi Arabia22 on the other, the respond-
ent States defend the lawfulness of their measures by invoking national 
security interests and refer to Articles XXI of the GATT and 73 of the 
 
certain duties on steel and aluminium products from Canada and Mexico, so that both 
panels were able to conclude their work (WTO doc WT/DS/550/R and WT/DS/551/R 
(11 July 2017)). 
18 See the debate in the DSB among the claimant and the respondent State 
representatives in WTO doc WT/DSB/M/420 (29 October 2018) 26-36; 
WT/DSB/M/422 (3 April 2019) 1-4.  
19 See First Written Submission of Norway (DS552), 1 May 2019, 
˂www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/0f2915693bae4cd8be6010e29ff2c590/2019.05.01-
ds552-norways-first-written-submission.pdf˃; First Written Submission of the United 
States of America (DS552) (12 June 2019) ˂https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/ 
enforcement/DS/US.Sub1.%28DS552%29.fin.%28public%29.pdf˃; First Written 
Submission of the European Union (DS548) (1 May 2019) ˂https://trade.ec.europa.eu/ 
wtodispute/show.cfm?id=772&code=1˃; First Written Submission of the United States 
of America (DS548) (12 June 2019) ˂https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/enforcement/ 
DS/US.Sub1.%28DS548%29.fin.%28public%29.pdf˃; First Written Submission of the 
United States of America (DS544) (12 June 2019) ˂https://ustr.gov/sites/default/ 
files/enforcement/DS/US.Sub1.%28DS544%29.fin.%28public%29.pdf˃.  
20 WTO doc WT/DS526/2 (6 October 2017). The panel was established on 28 
February 2018 and composed on 3 September 2018.  
21 WTO doc WT/DS527/1, G/L/1181, S/L/416, IP/D/36 (4 August 2017). The 
panel has not been established yet.  
22 WTO doc WT/DS528/1, G/L/1182, S/L/417, IP/D/37 (4 August 2017). The 
panel has not been established yet. Another claim has been filed by Qatar against Saudi 
Arabia to ascertain whether, as Qatar claims, Saudi Arabia has violated the TRIPS 
Agreement because copyrighted media contents owned by a Qatari company were subject 
to widespread piracy in Saudi Arabia while the company did not benefit from copyright 
protection: WTO doc WT/DS567/3 (19 November 2018). The panel was established on 
18 December 2018 and composed on 18 February 2019.  




TRIPS Agreement.23 While Qatar contests the lawfulness of the eco-
nomic embargo its Arab neighbours have imposed on it, they argue that 
Qatar has been funding international terrorist organizations.24 Moreover, 
like the US and Russia, the Gulf States maintain that Articles XXI and 
73 are self-judging provisions and that panels do not have jurisdiction to 
hear the cases.  
In both the cases above mentioned if panels confirm that GATT Ar-
ticle XXI is justiciable, but rule out that the US as well as the Gulf States’ 
measures fall under it, it may not be excluded that the respondent States 
(the United States, on one hand, the Gulf States, on the other) will appeal 
the panel reports before the AB to avoid the adoption of a DSB ruling 
ordering their withdrawal. On the contrary, if panels rebut the self-judg-
ing nature of national security exceptions or conclude that these are re-
viewable and that the US, as well as the Gulf States’ measures are in con-
formity with the security exceptions, domestic policy reasons may lead 
the applicants (Norway, the EU and Qatar) to react against such findings. 
Moreover, the applicants may be interested in seeking to prevent other 
States from implementing the same measures. In both scenarios, the lack 
of a functioning appellate review procedure will result in the hindering 




3.  Possible scenario  
 
Considering what has been just said, the most likely scenario is that the 
parties to the dispute will make an appeal to the AB to prevent the adop-
tion of panel reports because all involved States may have an advantage in 
exploiting the current crisis of the DSS.  
In the near future, those non-adopted panel reports, which nonetheless 
uphold the panel’s conclusion in the case Russia – Traffic in transit, might 
have the effect of preventing States from interpreting Article XXI in a way 
that differs from that generally accepted by panels. In fact, although no 
 
23 ibid. For an initial comment see J Fahner, ‘Qatar under Siege: Chances for an 
Article XXI Case?’ EJIL:Talk! (9 January 2018) ˂www.ejiltalk.org/qatar-under-siege-
chances-for-an-article-xxi-case/˃.  
24 WTO doc G/C/M/129 paras 5.8-5-14; WTO doc WT/DSB/M/422 (3 April 2019) 
para 5.3 f; WTO doc WT/DSB/M/423 paras 7.3-7.5.  
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DSU provision seems to bind panels to follow the findings of previous 
panel reports on the same issue, and even though panel reports that will 
remain in a limbo will not be binding on the disputing parties, because of 
their existence, they may at least have a moral persuasion effect on States.  
If, on the contrary, panels (or at least some of them) came to different 
conclusions about the reviewability of Article XXI and, possibly, to the 
interpretation of the scope of the same provision, this fact would introduce 
an element of uncertainty as to its interpretation and application, even 
though panel reports could not be adopted by the DSB. In other circum-
stances such uncertainty could have been resolved by appealing to the AB. 
The latter could have developed a coherent interpretation of Article XXI, 
that is not possible at the present time.      
Therefore, the emergence of a clear and well-established interpretation 
of national security exceptions is linked to the resolution of the AB crisis 
or, at least, to the setting up of an alternative and provisional mechanism 
of appeal.25 While in general terms, the risks of a single level of adjudica-
tion, especially that of contradictory reports on identical national 
measures, may be overcome by the existence of a well-established interpre-
tation of many WTO provisions, in the case of disputes concerning 
 
25 Some authors have proposed solutions to guarantee the adoption of panel reports 
when the AB is deadlocked and to provisionally renounce the right of appeal: S 
Charnovitz, ‘How to Save WTO Dispute Settlement from the Trump Administration’ 
International Economic Law and Policy Blog ˂https://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ 
ielpblog/2017/11/how-to-save-wto-dispute-settlement-from-the-trump-administration.html˃ ; S 
Charnovitz, ‘The Missed Opportunity to Save WTO Dispute Settlement’ International 
Economic Law Policy Blog ˂https://ielp.worldtradelaw.net/2019/12/the-missed-
opportunity-to-save-wto-dispute-settlement.html˃; H Gao ‘The Resurrection of the 
Appellate Body: Three Proposals’ International Economic Law Policy Blog 
˂https://ielp.worldtradelaw.net/2019/12/the-resurrection-of-the-appellate-body-three-
proposals.html˃; L E Salles, ‘Bilateral Agreements as an Option to Living Through the 
WTO AB Crisis’ International Economic Law and Policy blog 
˂https://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2017/11/guest-post-on-bilateral-agreements-as-
an-option-to-living-through-the-wto-ab-crisis.html˃). The conclusion of an ad hoc agreement 
between the disputing parties to refrain from appeal before the start of the panel 
proceedings has been adopted in two cases concerning a safeguard measure imposed by 
Indonesia on imports of certain flat-rolled iron or steel products from Vietnam and 
Chinese Taipei (Panel Report, Indonesia - Safeguard on Certain Iron or Steel Products, 
WT/DS490/R; WT/DS496/R (18 August 2017)): see WTO doc WT/DS496/14 (27 
March 2019) and WT/DS490/13 (15 April 2019). Within this framework an ad hoc 
agreement was concluded to grant the adoption of the panel report established under art 
21(5) of the DSU.       




provisions that have never been invoked, the likelihood of contradictory 
reports is high, since there would not be the AB’s ‘last world’ to pave the 
way to consistent rulings.26     
For this reason the analysis that follows will start by assessing the pro-
posals advanced to overcome the US criticism levelled against the AB and 
those aimed at circumventing the use of consensus in the nomination of 
AB members. The purpose is to verify whether their adoption might alter 
(or not) the AB legitimacy and authoritativeness. These requirements are 
essential for a judicial body that is called to solve disputes having a highly 
political nature, like those concerning measures adopted for national secu-
rity reasons. In the second part of this study, the proposals advanced to 
establish an alternative second level of adjudication, that would take the 
place of the AB, albeit temporarily, will be also assessed. They will be eval-
uated on the grounds of their capability to ensure the development of co-
herent case law on WTO law provisions that have never been interpreted.     
 
 
4.  How to re-establish a second level of adjudication: Proposals advanced so 
far   
 
Many proposals have been advanced to resolve the AB crisis. States 
have proposed amendments to the Dispute Settlement Understanding 
(DSU) in order to satisfy the main US concerns about the functioning of 
the DSS and in order to lead the US to give its consent to the appointment 
of new AB members.27 As has been aptly observed, State proposals put 
 
26 J Pauwelyn, (n 5) 12.  
27 Communication from the European Union, China, Canada, India, Norway, New 
Zealand, Switzerland, Australia, Republic of Korea, Iceland, Singapore, Mexico, Costa 
Rica and Montenegro to the General Council, WTO doc WT/GC/W/752/Rev.2 (11 
December 2018); Communication from the European Union, China, India and 
Montenegro to the General Council, WTO doc WT/GC/W/753/Rev.1 (11 December 
2018); Fostering a Discussion on the Functioning of the Appellate Body: Communication 
from Honduras, WTO doc WT/GC/W/758, WT/GC/W/759 (21 January 2019) and 
WT/GC/W/760 (29 January 2019); Guidelines for the Work of Panels and the Appellate 
Body: Communication from Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, WTO doc 
WT/GC/W/767/Rev.1 (25 April 2019); Informal Process on Matters Related to the 
Functioning of the Appellate Body: Communication from Japan, Australia and Chile, 
WTO doc WT/GC/W/768/Rev.1 (16 April 2019); General Council Decision on the 
Dispute Settlement System of WTO: Communication from Thailand, WTO doc 
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forward until now have uncritically upheld the grievances of the United 
States and are focused on limiting the role of the AB, to ensure greater 
control of States over it. Moreover, they do not make any assessment of the 
foundations of the US complaints.28    
 In October 2019, following extensive consultations, the facilitator ap-
pointed  by the GC Chair to help States find a solution to the paralysis in 
the process of the selection of AB members proposed the adoption by the 
GC of a decision on the functioning of the AB which essentially 
 
WT/GC/W/769 (26 April 2019); Appellate Body Impasse: Communication from the 
African Group, WTO doc WT/GC/W/776 (26 June 2019).  
28 G Adinolfi (n 2) 54, 58. It has been proposed to amend  the DSU by providing 
that only Member States are allowed to authorise a person who ceases to be a member of 
the AB to complete the disposition of any appeal to which that person was assigned while 
he/she was member of the AB. See WTO doc WT/GC/W/753/Rev.1, 3; WTO doc 
WT/GC/W/759, 1 f.; WTO doc WT/GC/W/767/Rev.1, Guideline n. 2; WTO doc 
WT/GC/W/769, 1 f.; WTO doc WT/GC/W/776, 2). At this time the rule is provided in 
the AB Working Procedure for Appellate Review (Rule 15), which was adopted by the 
AB. The US argues that it is not in conformity with the provision whereby the DSB has 
authority to decide on the appointment or re-appointment of AB members: Statements 
by the United States at the Meeting of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, Geneva, 
August 31, 2017 ˂https://geneva.usmission.gov/2017/08/31/statements-by-the-united-
states-at-the-august-31-2017-dsb-meeting/˃. Other proposals might also be implemented 
on the basis of authoritative interpretations of the DSU adopted by a three-quarters 
majority of votes (art IX:2 WTO Agreement). In response to US criticism about the AB’s 
tendency to review panel findings with regard to the meaning of domestic law, some 
States proposed clarifying that the AB’s mandate to review ‘issues of law covered in the 
panel report’ and ‘legal interpretations developed by the panel’ (art 17(6) DSU) does not 
extend to findings on the meaning of municipal law (WTO doc WT/GC/W/752/Rev.1, 
4; WTO doc WT/GC/W/760, 3; WTO doc WT/GC/W/768/Rev.1, 2; WTO doc 
WT/GC/W/769, 2). It has also been proposed to provide that the AB is competent to 
address the issues raised on appeal by parties to a dispute, but only to the extent necessary 
for its resolution (art 17(12) DSU). The aim is to curb the AB’s tendency to make findings 
on issues that are not relevant for the purpose of solving a dispute (WTO doc 
WT/GC/W/752/Rev.1, 4; WTO doc WT/GC/W/760, 2; WTO doc 
WT/GC/W/767/Rev.1, Guidelines 5; WTO doc WT/GC/W/769, 2 f.). Another 
proposal concerns the value of AB reports once adopted. It has been suggested that AB 
reports adopted by the DSB should not be considered definitive interpretations that bind 
panels or the AB in future disputes (WTO doc WT/GC/W/767/Rev.1, Guideline n. 6; 
WTO doc WT/GC/W/768/Rev.1, 2). Lastly, it has been proposed to clarify that art 17(5) 
of the DSU does not grant the AB any discretion to issue reports beyond the 90-day 
deadline set out therein (WTO doc WT/GC/W/759; WTO doc WT/GC/W/767/Rev.1, 
Guideline n. 3; WTO doc WT/GC/W/768/Rev.1, 2; WTO doc WT/GC/W/769, 2; 
WTO doc WT/GC/W/776, 2). 




summarizes the proposals advanced by States.29 During its last December 
meeting, the GC failed to reach the consensus needed to adopt the draft 
proposal.30 
Differently from States, some scholars have advanced proposals to re-
store the functioning of the AB by justifying the appointment of its mem-
bers in a way which is different than that provided in Article 2(4) of the 
DSU, but which would likewise be lawful under WTO law.   
In this spirit, Kuijper has recently advanced alternative solutions.31 The 
first one is to interpret Article 2(4) of the DSU − which provides for the 
DSB to select AB members by consensus − in the light of Article IX:I of 
the Agreement Establishing the WTO (so-called systemic interpretation). 
According to that latter provision, the WTO (in general) must continue 
the practice of decision-making by consensus followed under GATT 1947 
as a general rule but, ‘except when otherwise provided’, decisions may be 
adopted by a majority vote if consensus cannot be achieved. According to 
Kuijper, the systemic interpretation of Article 2(4) would confer on the 
DSB the authority to appoint AB members using a majority vote when con-
sensus is not reached. Moreover, according to the same author, while Ar-
ticle IX:I  precludes a decision by a majority vote when it is ‘otherwise pro-
vided’ − as in Article 2(4) − this limit can be overcome by taking Article 
XVI:332 of the Agreement Establishing the WTO into account. Indeed, 
Kuijper interprets the latter provision as creating a hierarchy between the 
WTO Agreement and the other covered agreements, including the DSU. 
What this author seems to refer to is an interpretation of the DSU con-
sistent with the Agreement Establishing the WTO, because of the latter’s 
nature as the constitutive instrument of the organization. 
 
29 In favour of an authoritative interpretation by the GC concerning the same points 
is G Sacerdoti, ‘Guest Post: A Consensual “Quick-Fix” for the WTO Appellate Body Is 
Possible If There Is the Will!’ International Economic Law and Policy Blog (17 October 
2019) <https://ielp.worldtradelaw.net/2019/10/guest-post-a-consensual-quick-fix-for-
the-wto-appellate-body-ispossible-if-there-is-the-will.html>.  
30 WTO doc JOB/GC/222 (15 October 2019) and WTO doc JOB/GC/225 (9 De-
cember 2019). See also WTO doc WT/GC/W/791 (28 November 2019).  
31 PJ Kuijper, ‘The US Attack on the WTO Appellate Body’ Amsterdam Law School 
Legal Studies Research Paper No 2017-44, 11 f ˂https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3076399 ˃.  
32 ‘In the event of a conflict between a provision of this Agreement and a provision 
of any of the Multilateral Trade Agreements, the provision of this Agreement shall prevail 
to the extent of the conflict’.  
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A similar solution has been proposed by Petersmann,33 who observes 
that the right (and duty) of the DSB to appoint AB members by a majority 
vote finds its rationale in the collective obligation of all WTO Members to 
maintain a functioning AB, as prescribed in Article 17 of the DSU. Accord-
ing to Petersmann, in order to overcome US objections to majority deci-
sions, the WTO Ministerial Conference or GC should adopt an authorita-
tive interpretation confirming the collective duty of Members to fill AB 
vacancies as they arise through majority decisions.34 
The second proposal advanced by Kujiper is that the GC select AB 
members by a majority vote. In Kuijper’s view, although the GC has no 
formal competence in this respect, when extraordinary circumstances oc-
cur ‘the law of international organizations’ justifies allowing an organ to 
perform functions that Members have conferred upon other organs. Kui-
jper refers to the UN General Assembly Resolution Uniting for Peace35 as 
a relevant precedent.  
Former AB member Jennifer Hillman has advocated in favour of em-
powering the GC to select AB members by a majority vote. The legal basis 
of the proposal is, in her opinion, the Agreement Establishing the WTO. 
Indeed, she observes that, according to Article III:3 of the Marrakesh 
Agreement, the WTO administers the DSU and from this she infers that 
the CG has power to appoint AB members by a majority vote because no 
provisions of WTO law make the CG’s power to do so conditional on the 
use of a specific majority.36 
Other commentators prefer the temporary replacement of the AB with 
arbitration as per Article 25 of the DSU rather than to justify the AB mem-
bers’ appointment with a majority vote on the ground of an extensive 
 
33 E-U Petersmann, ‘How Should the EU and Other WTO Members React to Their 
WTO Governance and WTO Appellate Body Crises?’ (2018) Robert Schuman Centre 
for Advanced Studies Research Paper No. RSCAS 2018/71, 8 fn 25 ˂https://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3300738˃.  
34 ibid 8.  
35 GA Res 377(V) (3 November 1950). 
36 J Hillman, ‘Three Approaches to Fixing the World Trade Organization’s Appellate 
Body: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly?’ Institute of International Economic Law 
Working Paper (2018) 13 (www.law.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/ 
Hillman-Good-Bad-Ugly-Fix-to-WTO-AB.pdf˃).  




interpretation of some provisions of the DSU or of the Marrakesh Agree-
ment.37   
Arbitration pursuant to Article 25 was and is conceived as an alterna-
tive to the mainstream dispute settlement process within the DSS and as a 
means of expeditiously solving disputes concerning issues that are clearly 
defined by both parties. Among those favouring this solution, there is a 
widespread belief that Article 25 is drafted in terms that are sufficiently 
flexible to allow a replication of the essential features of the appellate pro-
cess under Article 17 of the DSU.   
 
 
5.  Assessment of the advanced proposals   
 
It is time to evaluate whether the proposals discussed above offer the-
oretically and practically satisfactory solutions for restoring an effective ap-
pellate procedure, so as to grant the development of coherent case law on 
security exceptions.  
As far as States’ proposals are concerned, they seem to be based on an 
incorrect premise, namely, that the solution to the WTO dispute settle-
ment crisis lies in increasing the control of political organs over the system 
and in achieving the right balance of power between the political and judi-
cial wings of the WTO. The premise, as well as the solutions proposed, are 
far from convincing. Rather, a serious reflection on the practice of relying 
exclusively on consensus as a decision-making technique seems the only 
way to overcome the DSS crisis. As a technique for adopting decisions, 
consensus makes it ‘easier to maintain the current legal situation than to 
achieve change’.38 While deciding by consensus has preserved the grand 
bargain resulting from the Uruguay Round negotiations, using it as the ex-
clusive method for the adoption of decisions by WTO political organs has 
 
37 S Andersen and others, ‘Using Arbitration under Article 25 of the DSU to Ensure 
the Availability of Appeals’ (2017) Centre for Trade and Economic Integration Working 
Papers paras 3, 12-14 ˂repository.graduateinstitute.ch›files›CTEI-2017-17˃; A Raina, 
‘Mediation in an Emergency: The Appellate Body Deadlock. What It Is, Why It Is a 
Problem, and What to Do About It’ (2018) 13 Global Trade and Customs J 376-386; J 
Bacchus, ‘Saving the WTO’s Appeals Process’ (2018) ˂www.cato.org/blog/saving-wtos-
appeals-process˃; E Baroncini, Il funzionamento dell’Organo d’appello dell’OMC: bilancio 
e prospettive (Bonomo Editore, 2018) 127 ff.    
38 C-D Ehlermann, L Ehring (n 2) 65.  
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made such decisions difficult to achieve. Thus, the political wing of the 
WTO has appeared to be losing ground compared with the dynamic WTO 
dispute settlement bodies. In short, critical thinking about the ongoing use 
of consensus is warranted also in the light of the current DSS crisis. A re-
view of the cases where consensus applies should also take into account its 
use in relation to the appointment of AB members.  
In any event, a comprehensive rethinking of WTO voting procedures 
would require an amendment to the Agreement Establishing the WTO, ie 
not an achievable result in the short term. 
The proposals put forward by the aforementioned scholars are open to 
criticism as well.  
Kuijpers’ first proposal, namely that the DSB be allowed to appoint 
AB members by a majority vote, is based on disputable grounds.39  
Firstly, the idea of interpreting Article 2(4) of the DSU in the light of 
Article IXI:1 of the Agreement Establishing the WTO presupposes using 
a provision related to GC voting methods (Article XI:1) to interpret a pro-
vision (Article 2(4)) concerning the voting methods of a different organ 
(DSB). While all WTO Members are members of both the GC and the 
DSB, the latter has a different mandate and – above all – the Members’ 
representatives that sit in the DSB are frequently different (usually dispute 
settlement specialists).40 But even if one may assume such an interpretation 
to be legally founded, other perplexities remain. The proposal is based on 
the ground that Article XVI:341 of the WTO Agreement creates a hierarchy 
between the latter and the other covered agreements, including the DSU. 
That is, in view of such a hierarchy, in the event of a conflict between the 
provisions of the Marrakesh Agreement and those of the other WTO 
agreements, the latter should be interpreted in a manner that is consistent 
with the Agreement Establishing the WTO.  
The solution advanced is not persuasive. Indeed, it is hard to find an 
apparent conflict between Article 2(4) of the DSU and Article IX:I of the 
Agreement Establishing the WTO that – according to Article XVI:3 – 
would justify an interpretation of the former in conformity with the WTO 
Agreement. The expression ‘except as otherwise provided’ in Article IX:I 
 
39 J Pauwelyn (n 5) 6. 
40 J Hillman (n 36) 13.  
41 ‘In the event of a conflict between a provision of this Agreement and a provision 
of any of the Multilateral Trade Agreements, the provision of this Agreement shall prevail 
to the extent of the conflict’.  




is intended precisely to avoid a potential conflict between Article IX:I and 
other provisions of WTO law which provide for different rules for the 
adoption of decisions by WTO organs.  
In addition, and from a more general point of view, it is reasonable to 
ask whether States, in implementing Article IX:1 of the Marrakesh Agree-
ment, have actually given rise to a custom within the Organization which 
partially repeals Article IX:1, and which establishes consensus as the only 
rule for the adoption of decisions by the GC and the Ministerial Confer-
ence. In fact, in WTO practice, organs always take decisions by consensus 
and when conditions are not favourable to the reaching of a consensus, 
they prefer to forgo the adoption of a decision, rather than to resort to a 
qualified majority.  
Nor is the second proposal advanced by Kujipers fully convincing; in 
this case he suggests that the GC could select AB members because, in 
extraordinary circumstances, under the law of international organizations, 
an organ of an organization would be justified in performing functions that 
members had conferred on other organs. It is far from clear what the au-
thor of the proposal means when he speaks about ‘the law of international 
organizations’. He seems to be referring to a customary rule applied to in-
ternational organizations and authorizing the conduct previously men-
tioned. But the existence of such a rule is highly questionable. First, it is 
doubtful that the occasional implementation of Resolution 377(V) that has 
occurred since 195042 has brought into existence a customary rule author-
izing the General Assembly to act when the Security Council fails to exer-
cise its primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and se-
curity because of the lack of unanimity among the permanent Members. 
This practice was severely criticized by the socialist States and even some 
States that endorsed it changed their mind when they lost control of the 
General Assembly.43 Moreover, even if the practice were more frequent, 
but limited to the conduct of UN organs, this would not be sufficient to 
support the conclusion that a general customary rule has come into being 
and is binding upon every international organization. 
 
42 To date, ten special emergency sessions of the General Assembly have been 
convened: see C Tomuschat, ‘Uniting for Peace: Introductory Note’ ˂ http://legal.un.org/ 
avl/ha/ufp/ufp.html˃.  
43 In relation to this, see B Conforti, C Focarelli, The Law and Practice of the United 
Nations (3rd edn, CEDAM 2004) 225.  
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The proposal whereby the GC’s power to select the AB members by a 
majority vote could be derived from Article III:3 of the Marrakesh Agree-
ment stretches the meaning of the latter provision far beyond its textual 
meaning. Indeed, when the provision refers to the WTO’s responsibility to 
administer the DSU it clearly intends to express an obligation of the organ-
ization to establish and manage the DSS as a whole.  
The proposal to make use of the arbitration provided for under Article 
25 of the DSU as an alternative to the WTO Appellate Body in appeals 
related to panel reports has been followed by some States. The European 
Union has concluded, respectively, with Canada and Norway, two bilateral 
agreements under which the parties have committed, in the event of future 
disputes arising between them, to waive the right to appeal before the AB 
and to enter into ad hoc agreements to resort to arbitration pursuant to 
Article 25.44 Therefore, parties have assumed a pactum de contrahendo to 
reduce the risk that they may lose interest in appealing. While from a prac-
tical point of view this may be a way to prevent an appeal submitted to the 
AB from blocking the adoption of a panel report, from a theoretical point 
of view it is not fully satisfactory.  
Arbitration pursuant to Article 25 was and is conceived as an alterna-
tive to the normal dispute settlement process within the DSS, and, specifi-
cally, a means of expeditiously solving disputes concerning issues that are 
clearly defined by both parties.45 However, the suggestion that arbitration 
be resorted to as a substitute for the appellate review distorts the argu-
ments behind the decision to provide for an alternative method of dispute 
settlement in the DSU.  
Moreover, the only dispute where arbitration under Article 25 was trig-
gered does not prove that it can replace the appeal proceeding and become 
an integral part of the mainstream dispute settlement process.  
In the case United States - Section 110(5) of US Copyright Act, the arbi-
trator established pursuant to Article 25 was asked to perform an activity 
 
44 Interim Appeal Arbitration Pursuant to Article 25 of the DSU between the 
European Union and Canada (25 July 2019) ˂https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/ 
2019/july/tradoc_158273.pdf˃; Interim Appeal Arbitration Pursuant to Article 25 of the 
DSU between the European Union and Norway (21 October 2001) ˂https://trade.ec. 
europa.eu/doclib/docs/2019/october/tradoc_158394.pdf˃. 
45 See the text of art XXV:I. See also ‘Improved Dispute Settlement: Elements for 
Consideration. Discussion Paper Prepared by United States Delegation’ GATT doc No 
MTN.GNG/NG13/W/6 (25 June 1987). 




that was not regulated in the DSU, namely, to define the amount of nulli-
fication or impairment the European Communities had suffered as a result 
of the implementation of US legislation. Such an appraisal served as a 
benchmark intended to help States in dispute to reach an agreement on 
compensation. Therefore, it seems that the arbitration pursuant to Article 
25, although used in the course of the ordinary procedure for dispute set-
tlement, was intended as a means to fill a gap – that is, there was a need to 
estimate the damage incurred in order to help the parties to the dispute to 
reach a compensation agreement – and was not meant to take the place of 
the arbitration pursuant to Article 22(6).46 For this reason, using this single 
case to assert that arbitration under Article 25 could replace the AB since 
it has already been resorted to in the framework of the mainstream dispute 
settlement proceeding instead of arbitration under Article 22(6) does not 
result in a fully convincing argument.47 As admitted by the same Arbitrator 
in the proceedings established pursuant to Article 25, recourse to the same 
should not circumvent the DSU.48  
 
 
6.  The development of coherent case law on provisions never interpreted to 
date: A critical scenario 
 
The considerations set forth in the previous paragraph lead the present 
author to conclude that the proposals advanced to ensure the appointment 
of new AB members, albeit having the merit of re-establishing the func-
tioning of an organ which can ensure the development of consistent case 
law on security exceptions, are not technically satisfactory. Therefore, they 
risk jeopardizing the legitimacy of the AB.   
Arbitration under Article 25, whose limits have been illustrated above, 
would offer an alternative means of appealing a panel report. But what 
 
46 Art 22(6) of the DSU provides that an arbitration proceeding other than that under 
art 25 has the task of defining the amount of nullification or impairment the injured party 
has suffered. It is intended not to help States to reach an agreement as to compensation, 
but rather to intervene in the following stage of the proceeding, specifically when the 
wrongdoer objects to the level of suspension of concessions or other obligations proposed 
by the injured State.  
47 This is the opinion of E Baroncini (n 37) 136 ff.  
48 Award of the Arbitrators, United States – Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act 
(Article 25) fn 22 to para 2.1 and para 2.5.  
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about its effect on the development of coherent and well-established WTO 
case law on national security exceptions?  
On one hand it does not appear to be a good tool in terms of the con-
tribution it can make to the development of WTO case law on provisions 
never before interpreted. Indeed, in so far as the institution of arbitral tri-
bunals will be the result of bilateral agreements between WTO Members, 
their reports cannot ‘become part of a consistent body of case law due to 
[their] lack of an institutional position in the system’.49 This negative out-
come might be overcome if an authoritative interpretation was adopted by 
the GC providing for arbitration as a substitute for appellate review as long 
as the appointment of AB members remains blocked, as suggested by Pe-
tersmann.50 However, the supporters of Article 25 arbitration also advo-
cate that it should replicate the essential features of the AB process. There-
fore, the question arises as to whether there would ultimately be any dif-
ference from the AB. 
On the other hand, it is not completely to say that criticism concerning 
the lack of a formal institutional stance of arbitrations under Article 25 
agreements could not be overcome through the expertise and authorita-
tiveness of the arbitrators. If, as provided in the agreements already con-
cluded,51 former AB members will be selected as arbitrators, they should 
surely be aware of the importance of adopting non-contradictory deci-
sions, especially in cases requiring the interpretation of politically sensitive 
provisions, like GATT Article XXI. Their expertise may help in consoli-
dating an interpretation of security exceptions, although not formally part 
of the WTO case law as intended until now. 
All that remains for us to say is to bitterly conclude that among the 
proposals advanced to cope with the risk of DSS paralysis, only the estab-
lishment of an arbitral tribunal under Article 25 might, under certain con-
ditions, guarantee a certain degree of consistency on the of interpretation 
of provisions such as GATT Article XXI, which, if applied as a blank 
cheque in the hands of States, may hamper the functioning of the interna-
tional trade system. The problem remains the low probability that States 
 
49 G Sacerdoti, ‘The Stalemate Concerning the Appellate Body of the WTO: Any 
Way Out?’ (2019) 63 QIL-Questions Intl L 54. 
50 E-U Petersmann, ‘Between “Member-Driven” WTO Governance and 
“Constitutional Justice”: Judicial Dilemmas in GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement’ (2018) 
21 J Intl Economic L 116. 
51  See (n 44).   




which have been invoking the non self-judging nature of Article XXI are 
ready to conclude Article 25 agreements and commit to making use of ar-
bitral tribunals as an appellate mechanism even in cases where the claims 
concern the alleged unlawful use of security exceptions.   
This conclusion highlights once again the urgency of restoring an insti-
tutional mechanism for appellate review in a system where huge economic 
interests may easily tempt States to limit the predictability of dispute set-
tlement processes.  
